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The Speech of Dasein: Heidegger and Quotidian Discourse
Alexander Gelley
My point of departure is found in §35 of Sein und Zeit, where Martin 
Heidegger deals with Gerede, idle talk. His denunciation is so confident, 
so scathing:
And since this discoursing has lost the primary relation of being 
[Sein] to the being [Seienden] talked about, or else never achieved 
it, it does not communicate in the mode of a primordial appropria-
tion of this being, but communicates by gossiping and passing the 
word along. What is spoken about as such spreads in wider circles 
and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one 
says so. Idle talk is constituted in this gossiping and passing the 
word along, a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on 
increases to complete groundlessness. (1949: 168)1
1. I follow this revision of the 1996 Stambaugh translation in accepting the spelling of 
“Dasein” throughout rather than “Da- sein.” All page references to this work are to the 
German edition, which are also given in the margins of the English edition.
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What could Heidegger be talking about? It sounds so sinister and threat-
ening. In looking for illustrations in literature, one could cite characters like 
Pecksniff or Mrs. Gamp (Martin Chuzzlewit) or Skimpole (Bleak House) or 
Podsnap (Our Mutual Friend ) in Dickens, characters whose speech is very 
nearly an idiolect of bad faith, a model of inauthentic self- presentation. And 
yet there is something so fascinating and creative in their language, an exu-
berance in their dissimulation, that one wouldn’t want to miss it. Or there is 
the confidence man in his multiple masquerades in Melville’s great novel. 
But the list could go on and on.
How might Heidegger’s category of Gerede be understood in relation 
to examples such as these? Could idle talk in Heidegger’s sense contrib-
ute something to the theoretization of Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of the dialogic 
and heteroglossia, and to the notion of discours as it has been developed 
by Émile Benveniste, Roland Barthes, and Gérard Genette? What interests 
me especially is how language, in prose fiction, is valorized (often implicitly) 
as meaning/nonsense, serious/nonserious, full/empty. Bakthin’s “carnival-
ization,” Erich Auerbach’s analysis of the transformation of the classical 
hierarchy of styles, Wlad Godzich and Jeffrey Kittay’s idea of the “invention” 
(and repeated reinvention) of prose serve as helpful models for this kind of 
analysis. I want to pay particular attention to language that is deemed low, 
formulaic, or “empty”—gossip, chatter, prattle, idiotisms. When talk (dis-
cours) loses the thread of narrative, “nothing much” is said, but saying as 
act and process is foregrounded. It is this kind of inadvertence in language 
that I think of as its “idling” state.2
In literary usage, talk, speech, dialogue, and other such terms for 
oral articulation are, of course, conveyed in writing. The premise of narra-
tion is the enactment, or representation, of speech, a point that is implicit 
in the term discours in French narratology. But my focus is on a different 
issue, namely, the dividing line between thought and speech, reflection and 
verbal articulation.
Speech that is dissociated from thinking or reflection is usually valo-
rized in a negative manner. Expressions like “(the mouth) running on,” “blab-
bering,” “stammering,” “words gushing out,” et cetera, suggest an impair-
ment of speech that necessarily compromises the meaning. The norm of 
speech, its optimal exercise, assumes a priority of thought or reflection, 
as is indicated in expressions like “speaking deliberately,” or “speaking 
2. I have dealt with this issue in an essay focused on two works by Henry James, “In the 
Cage” and The Sacred Fount: see Gelley 2001.
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thoughtfully.” Indeed, the traditional model of the derivation of speech is 
found in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: “Now spoken sounds are symbols 
of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds” 
(1987: 12).3 Speech and writing are both classified here at the level of signs. 
For each there is a derivation from a prior modality, and in the case of 
speech this is located in the mind or soul. This model still governs Edmund 
Husserl’s conception of voice in inner monologue in Logical Investigations, 
volume 1, as Jacques Derrida has demonstrated. Husserl here posits voice 
in a phenomenological sense, that is, (inner) voice as an inviolate source, 
which does not itself “mean” but which all acts of expression or articulation 
indicate or point to. Derrida has demonstrated how this constitutes a con-
tinuation of the long- standing link between voice and logos (1973: 15–16). 
What, then, is left for discourse? Is it to be understood as merely instru-
mental, the signs of a prior formulation in thought?
Heinrich von Kleist’s text “On the Gradual Construction of Thoughts 
during Speech” (“Über die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim 
Reden”), in a characteristically playful, paradoxical manner, illustrates the 
performative power of speech and puts forward a challenge to the tradi-
tional priority of thought over speech. The thesis is clearly stated right at 
the beginning:
If there is something you want to know and cannot discover by medi-
tation, then, my dear, ingenious friend, I advise you to discuss it with 
the first acquaintance whom you happen to meet. He need not have 
a sharp intellect, nor do I mean you should question him on the sub-
ject. No! Rather you yourself should begin by telling it all to him.
I can see you opening your eyes wide at this and replying that in 
former years you were advised never to talk about anything that you 
do not already understand. In those days, however, you probably 
spoke with the pretentious purpose of enlightening others—I want 
you to speak with the reasonable purpose of enlightening yourself, 
and it is possible that each of these rules of conduct, different as 
they are, will apply in certain cases. The French say: l’appétit vient 
en mangeant and this maxim holds true when parodied into: l’idée 
vient en parlant. (1951: 42)
There follows then a series of anecdotes, each of which, in one way or 
another, demonstrates how, in a given situation, a speaker who had no 
3. See Heidegger 1985 (242–43) for a discussion of this passage.
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clear idea what he was going to say, is so carried along by an association 
of words or ideas, or else by the reaction of an interlocutor, that he is led to 
a formulation that brings about a decisive change in the situation at hand.
In the context of Kleist’s oeuvre, this text may be viewed as yet 
another demonstration ex negativo of the yearning in a postlapserian uni-
verse for the kind of innocence and spontaneity (Grazie in the language 
of “On the Marionette Theatre”) that is associated with man’s original, 
Edenic state. There is a recurrent pattern whereby Kleist represents the 
presence-absence, or rather the presence-as-absence in human exis-
tence of this state of grace. The axiomatic formulation of the underlying 
moral cosmogony is found in “On the Marionette Theatre”: “We have eaten 
of the tree of knowledge. And Paradise is bolted with the cherub behind 
us; we must journey around the world and determine if perhaps at the end 
somewhere there is an opening to be discovered again” (1972: 24). The 
conclusion of the dialogue offers another version of this idea when one of 
the speakers in the dialogue asks, “Therefore . . . would we again have to 
eat of the tree of knowledge to fall back again into a state of innocence?” 
(26; translation modified). It is worth noting here that the German, “in den 
Stand der Unschuld zurückzufallen,” suggests something like a reverse 
fall, an undoing of the Fall, an “un- falling” into innocence. This point is rele-
vant not so much for its theological or moral implications but as a pointer 
to a narrative or rhetorical practice that one finds recurrently in Kleist’s 
writings.
In “On the Gradual Construction of Thoughts during Speech,” Kleist 
develops a model of speech that is not merely instrumental but operates 
coordinately with thought for purposes of cognition and expression. At one 
point the narrator summarizes the issue as follows:
This kind of speech is nothing less than articulated thought. The 
chains of ideas and of their designations proceed together at the 
same speed, and the mental documents for the one and for the other 
agree. Then speech is not an impediment, a sort of brake on the 
wheel of intellect, but like a second wheel running parallel with it on 
the same axle.
It is quite a different matter when the mind has already finished 
off the thought before speech begins. For then the mind must pause 
at the mere expression, and this business, far from exciting it, has 
indeed no other effect than to provide relaxation from excitement. 
(1951: 44–45)
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The model of speech that Kleist develops here is akin to the idea of walking 
as a repeatedly arrested falling. Speech here is not subordinate to thought 
but the two are linked in a kind of intermittent coupling in which they alter-
nately precipitate and retard one another. In one sense this is very much 
within the traditional model of the copresence of expression and meaning 
(Ausdruck and Bedeutung in Husserl) in the self. But the models Kleist 
puts forward in the anecdotes complicate the issue significantly. If there 
were a true parallelism between speaking and thinking (Sprache/Geist in 
Kleist’s text), thinking would be complete in its inner, meditative state. But 
this clearly is not what the examples demonstrate. In fact, there is a lag, a 
displacement between the two, and it is this tension that serves as a means 
of excitation (Erregung) and as a stimulus for a continuing verbal articu-
lation. “Lautes Denken” here is not to be understood as a simultaneity of 
speech and thought that resolves the dichotomy of present/past or pres-
ence/absence. Rather, what is involved is perhaps best likened to a form of 
associative thinking based on a structure of Nachträglichkeit in the sense 
that Derrida develops the Freudian notion, that is, of “a ‘past’ that has never 
been nor will ever be present, whose ‘future’ will never be produced or 
reproduced in the form of presence” (1973: 152).
In the examples that Kleist provides, idle talk serves as a means of 
gathering energy for purposes of a sudden release in action. The act itself 
has the quality of an inexplicable irruptive force. What Kleist illustrates is 
the diversionary talk that allows the irruption to occur. “I interpose inarticu-
late sounds, draw out the connecting words, possibly even use an apposi-
tion when required and employ other tricks which will prolong my speech in 
order to gain sufficient time for the fabrication of my idea in the workshop 
of reason” (1951: 42). One should not conclude that Kleist here is simply 
inverting the traditional priority of thought over speech. Rather, as Christian 
Strub rightly argues, the text develops “a different idea of the faculty of lan-
guage, one in which speech is still the ‘servant’ of thought, but in the sense 
that language inhabits the current of speech not as a mere accessory but 
as the very ground of the thought” (1988: 286). This ground, however, Strub 
continues, should not be taken as a reliable basis for the communication of 
truth. The transmission of truth, for Kleist, is in principle uncertain and vac-
illating, ever subject to disturbance, to lapses into conventionality and dis-
simulation, and capable of succeeding only rarely through the intervention 
of a well- nigh miraculous good fortune.
While I am well aware that “On the Gradual Construction of Thoughts 
during Speech” offers a very restricted instance of idle talk, what makes this 
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text relevant is that Kleist puts forward a conception of language that, like 
Heidegger’s, bypasses a representational as well as an expressive model 
of language and focuses instead on a pragmatic or performative dimen-
sion, one that takes such performativity not simply as a consequence of the 
operation of language but as a foundational element.4
Let me now turn to Heidegger. In the Greek tradition, the basic epis-
temological terminology was related to sight, visuality. Heidegger does not 
ignore this, but he does not grant it exclusive preeminence either. The world 
in which man finds himself is not simply an out- there, to be apprehended 
as seen, but one that is already worked over in terms of human needs and 
projects. The “relation” of man and world cannot properly be termed “rela-
tion” at all since one cannot think a world separate from human existence 
nor, conversely, think human existence in isolation from its world. The early 
parts of Sein und Zeit are focused on this meshed fabric of availability that 
constitutes the being- in- the- world of Dasein. The notion of Erschlossen-
heit, disclosedness, is central to this argument.
For Heidegger, any idea of “mankind” or human existence is predi-
cated on an originary form of access to a world. Dasein (being there), 
in- der- Welt- sein (being- in- the- world)—these formulations express the 
co- originary (gleichursprünglich) status of human existence and world. 
Dasein’s being- in- the- world testifies both to the availability of world but also 
to Dasein’s circumstantial (geworfen, thrown or outcast) status in the world, 
thrown or enmeshed in a situation that is not of its own making, a situation 
that Dasein did not create and thus cannot altogether master.
The twist or flexion in Heidegger’s analysis is that, along with the dis-
closedness or availability of the world, there is also a closing or withdrawal. 
Not that phenomena are deceptive or inaccessible. Truth is predicated on 
a fundamental dis- closedness of reality, thus a- leitheia, un-concealedness 
(Heidegger 1949: 33). But the work of truth, its coming to light, involves a 
process in which the privative elements are as important as the positive or 
revelatory ones.
In addition to Dasein, there is another term for human existence, 
4. Krzysztof Ziarek writes, “Benjamin and Heidegger propose models of language that 
might be called translational or transpositional. . . . They render the problem of repre-
sentation secondary : they preempt, as it were, the issue of referentiality of language by 
extending the notion of language to the very event of manifestation, to phenomenality 
itself. . . . In this view, the world is not only thought and experienced within language, that 
is, as always already transposed (translated) into language, but takes itself the form of a 
language event” (2001: 55).
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one that, in a sense, underscores the commonality—and also the com-
monness—of the human lot, and this is das Man, translated as “the they.” 
There is something uncanny in Heidegger’s German neologism that does 
not come across in English. In German, man and Mann, though identi-
cal in pronunciation, have quite different meanings. Mann is translated 
into English as “man” and would require a masculine article (der Mann). 
German man (not capitalized) is an impersonal pronoun that could signify 
either “one” or “they” (as in “they say” or “one says” or “people say”). As 
a pronoun, man is never used with an article. Thus, the locution das Man 
(with the capital, as if it were a noun) has the effect of a deformation of 
Mann, as if man (mankind) could be reduced to a level of impersonality.
To draw or extract a meaning from phenomena involves, in Heideg-
ger’s terms, a distinct and forcible process: “The way of encountering being 
and the structures of being in the mode of phenomenon,” Heidegger writes, 
“must first of all be wrested [abgewonnen werden] from the objects of phe-
nomenology” (36). What Heidegger terms “wresting” here involves a deci-
sive feature of his conception of phenomenology, namely, that the mean-
ing or sense (Sinn) of phenomena can become accessible only through 
an interplay of hiding and disclosure, and further, that this sense is unique 
to each phenomenon: “Essentially, nothing else stands ‘behind’ the phe-
nomena of phenomenology. Nevertheless, what is to become a phenome-
non can be concealed. And precisely because phenomena are initially and 
for the most part not given phenomenology is needed. Being covered up is 
the counterconcept to ‘phenomenon’ [Verdecktheit ist der Gegenbegriff zu 
‘Phänomen’ ]” (36).
What I want to pursue now is how, within the argument of Sein und 
Zeit, language enters into the covering/uncovering process that Heidegger 
initially locates at the level of phenomenology. But in doing so, he is in no 
sense setting up an order of priority whereby a level of conception or per-
ception is made antecedent to that of language. As Krzystof Ziarek writes, 
“The Heideggerian insight into language pivots upon the recognition of the 
already linguistic character of phenomenality, on the idea that manifesta-
tion is a form of a ‘showing saying’: ‘The saying is by no means the supple-
mentary linguistic expression of what shines forth; rather all shining and 
fading depend on the saying that shows’” (2001: 57).5 This citation is from 
“The Way to Language,” written in 1959, but already in Sein und Zeit, which 
appeared in 1927, we read, “Discoursing [Reden] is the ‘significant’ articu-
5. The citation is from Heidegger 1993 (414).
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lation of the intelligibility of being- in- the- world” (Heidegger 1949: 161). Fur-
ther, I want to clarify in what sense the issue of disclosure (covering/uncov-
ering) is related to what will be the “entanglement,” Verfall, of language in 
the everyday, Alltäglichkeit, which is, precisely, Gerede.
For this entanglement or lapse of signifying discourse, of language 
as speech, Rede, is not, as we will see, merely a feature of language but 
is the very condition of language, since the worldly is itself lapsed, fallen 
out of being and consigned to the status of beings in the world. “Initially, 
Dasein is the they and for the most part it remains so. If Dasein explicitly 
discovers the world and brings it near, if it discloses its authentic being to 
itself, this discovering of ‘world’ and disclosing of Dasein always comes 
about by clearing away coverings and obscurities, by breaking up the dis-
guises with which Dasein cuts itself off from itself” (129).
To anticipate the argument: on the one hand, Gerede denotes a kind 
of defective mode of understanding, typical of the impersonal construct 
of the public subject that Heidegger terms “das Man,” the they. Gerede is 
the medium for what is termed “alltägliche Ausgelegtheit” (the quotidian, 
routinized form of interpretation and explanation), which is the basis for 
Dasein’s understanding of phenomena. But at the same time, consistent 
with the phenomenological principle enunciated above—that hiddenness is 
the counterconcept to phenomenon, to showing-forth—Gerede, in its very 
accessibility and commonness, may also serve as an opening to a dimen-
sion of being or truth.
Earlier I indicated that Dasein, the being- there of being- in- the- world, 
expresses the co-originary status of human existence and world. What is 
elided in this schema—what necessarily eludes determination—is pre-
cisely the what, that is, the content or substance of what is apprehended or 
exchanged in the coupling of human existence and world.
In the philosophical tradition, this element has been designated as 
Logos, a term that has been variously translated, Heidegger notes, as “rea-
son, judgment, concept, definition, ground, relation” (32). What Heidegger 
foregrounds from this semantic network is a fusion of man’s articulating 
capacity, ratio, with the power to apprehend, to see, apophainestai, letting 
something, “namely what is being talked about,” be seen (32). These are 
co-originary, and constitute a prelingual, discursive disclosure of world for 
Dasein. Heidegger thus underscores the fact that articulation and mani-
festation are from the start indissoluble. What is disclosed (as world) has 
already been formulated, though only as the possibility of speech, not yet 
its concrete realization.
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This stage in the analysis of the language field is termed Rede, dis-
course, a term that may give rise to some confusion since it does not yet 
signify language as generally understood. Rather, it designates a prelin-
gual, discursive disclosure of world for Dasein. It is only in a subsequent 
stage of the analysis that Rede attains to concrete realization, as language, 
Sprache, the phonic articulation in words, “stimmliche Verlautbarung in 
Worten” (32–33). “When fully concrete, speech [Rede] (letting something 
be seen) has the character of speaking [des Sprechens] or vocalization in 
words” (32).
What marks the threshhold between Rede and Sprache, between 
prelingual discourse and the articulation of language in words? This is a 
crucial moment in the derivation (construction) of Dasein since it leads 
from a stage of “primordial disclosedness of being- in- the- world” (160) to 
one that—we need to proceed cautiously here—is inescapably caught up, 
enmeshed in (Verfallen) “a specifically worldly mode of being” (161).
I am glossing here §34 of Sein und Zeit, “Dasein and Discourse: 
Language.” Heidegger remarks here, “Discourse is existentially equiprimor-
dial with attunement and understanding” (161), but he notes also that this 
elucidation of discourse and language “only now becomes thematic.” Thus, 
it is quite late in the argument, only after the treatment of the other two 
“fundamental existentials of the being of the there [Da]” of Dasein, namely, 
of attunement and understanding, that he turns to an explicit development 
regarding discourse. It is worth noting too that not only does the treatment 
of discourse and language come very late, but it also enters the argument 
as a derivative of the analysis of understanding. This derivation, which is 
worked out in §§32–33, is summarized at the beginning of §34: “An extreme 
derivative of interpretation was made visible with the statement. The clari-
fication of the third meaning of statement [Aussage, assertion] as commu-
nication (speaking forth) led us to the concept of saying and speaking, to 
which we purposely paid no attention up to now. The fact that language 
only now becomes thematic should indicate that this phenomenon has its 
roots in the existential constitution of the disclosedness of Dasein” (160). I 
am laying stress on this derivation, on the way that discourse and language 
only gradually emerge in the argument, in order to show that although dis-
course, Rede, is thematized as an “existential,” that is, as one of the three 
coordinate, originary (“equiprimordial”) constituents of the disclosedness 
(Erschlossenheit) of Dasein, it could not be posited in itself as a founda-
tional, grounding category. It had to be shown that discourse is always 
already implicated in understanding and attunement.
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Have we arrived at language yet? Hardly. The analysis of being- in, 
of the there, the Da, in which Dasein is shown to have an opening, an 
access to worldly reality in §§29–33, is notably lacking in any consideration 
of words, of language in its lexical and grammatical articulation. Yet there is 
meaning, there is an articulation that is termed “the totality of significations” 
(161), but so far there has been nothing like an endowment of speech, no 
words to attach to the significations made available to Dasein in the disclo-
sure of world.
If we view Heidegger’s ontology up to this point as a cosmology, 
we might say that he has given us a creation narrative but no origin of lan-
guage, no “Namengebung” like Adam’s in Genesis. There is, as it were, no 
pre- Babelic stage of language here. Language is from the start implicated 
in the state of “Verfall” of Dasein, not in the sense of the Christian Fall, 
but as a constitutive lapse, a falling into an entanglement with the world. 
Insofar as there is an origin of language in Heidegger’s cosmogenesis, 
it is, in the following passage, both acknowledged and elided, “discourse 
must also essentially have a specifically worldly mode of being. The attuned 
intelligibility of being- in- the- world is expressed as discourse. The totality of 
significations of intelligibility is put into words. Words accrue to significa-
tions” (161).
“Words accrue to significations [Den Bedeutungen wachsen Worte 
zu].” What Heidegger seems to express in this formula is the radical imma-
nence of language with regard to the referencing of the worldly. Heidegger 
thus bypasses the problematic of a representational conception with its 
necessity of accounting for the relation of language to its outside, in short, 
the problem of reference. As Martin Seel puts it, “The ‘primary significa-
tions’ are not given in the work of predication, but rather in being involved 
with something where this becomes important. It is from this significance, 
Heidegger argues, that words accrue to significations” (1992: 335).6
What I want to trace now is a kind of slippage that seems to take 
place as Heidegger, in §34, pursues the analysis of what happens to Rede 
in its “specifically worldly mode of being,” that is as Sprache, as articulate 
6. “Das ‘primäre Bedeuten’ sei nicht in Leistungen der Prädikation gegeben, vielmehr 
in dem Zutunhaben mit etwas, worin dieses belangvoll werde. Aus dieser Bedeutsam-
keit, lehrte Heidegger, wächst unseren Worten Bedeutung zu” (Seel 1992: 335). Matthew 
Rampley confirms this argument. “The significations of Rede . . . are both logically distinct 
from and prior to the lexical items of any language. For language is the mere medium of 
expression of Rede, rather than comprising any autonomous sphere of activity” (1994: 
218).
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language. But to clarify what is happening, we would do well to revert briefly 
to an earlier section, §33 on Aussage (statement, assertion). This notion 
derives from understanding (by way of interpretation), one of the two fun-
damental existentials treated so far. (Stimmung, attunement is the other; 
Sprache will be a third.)
Heidegger distinguishes three elements in statement (Aussage): (1) 
pointing out (Aufzeigen), (2) predication, (3) communication (Mitteilung). 
The last introduces the dimension of hearing, listening to. And indeed, 
hearing, listening, will be “constitutive for discourse” in the subsequent dis-
cussion of Rede (163). This is not surprising when we recall the centrality of 
Mitdasein in §26: “The world of Dasein is a with- world ” (118). In this sense, 
as Matthew Rampley notes, “meaning is never merely something produced 
by Dasein, but that which always already governs Dasein’s encounter with 
the world” (1994: 220). It is noteworthy that in discussing the communica-
tive dimension of statement, Aussage, in §33 Heidegger had prepared for 
a deviancy, a flaw in disclosure at the level of transmission. “What is spo-
ken can be ‘passed along’ in further retelling . . . what is pointed out can 
become veiled again in this further retelling” (1949: 155).
How is this “passing along,” this mutation in transmission, different 
from the complete rootlessness of Gerede as it is then to be character-
ized in §35? In fact, this characterization seems to be an intensification of 
“passing along,” of hearsay. Once we have finished with the initial charac-
terization of language, Sprache, we are reminded that “our interpretation 
has in a way lost sight of the everydayness of Dasein. . . . Dasein [is] initially 
and for the most part immersed in the they and mastered by it” (167). And 
this launches us in the crucial, but in many ways puzzling, §34.
In this section, Heidegger calls for a fundamental reorientation of our 
approach to language, one that reaches back to a conception of logos ante-
cedent to its formalization by way of logic and grammar. “The Greeks do not 
have a word for language, they ‘initially’ understood this phenomenon as 
discourse. However, since the logos came into their philosophical view pre-
dominantly as statement, the development of the fundamental structures 
of the forms and constituents of discourse was carried out following the 
guideline of this logos. Grammar searched for its foundation in the ‘logic’ 
of this logos” (165). Heidegger does not provide any historical evidence 
for what constituted an antecedent stage, but he does attempt to illustrate 
communication as a “fundamental constituent of Dasein . . . the articulation 
of being- with- one- another understandingly” (162). In elaborating the notion 
of communication, he develops discourse (Rede) to encompass listening 
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and hearkening (Hörenkönnen, Horchen) and provides highly differentiated 
examples: “‘Initially’ we never hear noises and complexes of sound, but the 
creaking wagon, the motorcycle. We hear the column on the march, the 
north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the crackling fire. It requires a very 
artificial and complicated attitude in order to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’” (163). 
This kind of specification is rare in Sein und Zeit.
Gerede now is the first of a series of characteristics of the “durch-
schnittliche Verständlichkeit” (average, leveling intelligibility) (168), mani-
festations of the everydayness of spoken language. The others that are 
treated successively are curiosity and ambiguity. But it is the discussion of 
Gerede that is the most subtle and differentiated in this section. Often, in 
fact, the subsequent modalities of this “average intelligibility” are explicated 
in terms of Gerede, as with curiosity (173). It’s as if a disease had overtaken 
Dasein’s access to the world.
But even the way in which the term Gerede is introduced is some-
what curious. In its normal connotation, the word certainly has a negative, 
disparaging valence—hearsay, gossip, idle talk (Geschwätz is somewhat 
stronger, more condemning, more a sense of empty, debased speech). But 
Heidegger has prepared for his use of Gerede in §35 by a fourfold dis-
tinction regarding language in §34: (a) das Beredete, (b) das Geredete, 
(c) Mitteilung, (d) Bekundung. These are termed “konstitutive Momente” 
(constitutive factors) of Rede and are discussed in sequence (162). But 
the English version makes it hard to note the terminological differentiation.
 (a) Das Beredete is “what is talked about”; Rampley writes that it 
“could equally well be translated as the ‘referent’” (1994: 218).
 (b) Das Geredete is “what is spoken as such” (Heidegger 2010: 162).
 (c) Mitteilung is communication.
 (d) Bekundung is what is “made known in discourse and indicated in 
language” (162).
Though each of these terms would warrant detailed treatment, it is the first 
two that concern us most. At this stage, the distinction between them might 
be understood as one between logical content (das Beredete) and gram-
matical form (das Geredete). In a sense, it could also be taken as replicat-
ing the distinction between Rede and Sprache. But the kind of falling off or 
flaw that Heidegger attaches to Gerede in §35 is not evident in this discus-
sion of das Geredete in §34.
The earlier passage, where discourse (Rede) was characterized as 
the “putting into words” of “the totality of significations of intelligibility” (Hei-
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degger 1949: 161), seems to mark the step from das Beredete to das Gere-
dete, but it is difficult to understand how this “putting into words” can lead to 
the kind of lapse or entanglement that will be assigned to Gerede. Yet that 
is just what Heidegger implies in §35.
“One understands not so much the beings talked about [das beredete 
Seiende], but one does listen to what is spoken about as such [das Gere-
dete als solches]” (168). This is curious. Heidegger seems to be suggesting 
(as Rampley puts it) that “the function of statement [Aussage, assertion] 
as an expression of Being- in- the- world is being in a sense supplanted by 
the semantic structures of language, in other words das Beredete or the 
referent is covered up by the surface meaning of das Geredete” (Ramp-
ley 1994: 221). A bit further on this page of Heidegger’s text, we read, “dis-
coursing has lost the primary relation of being to the being talked about, or 
else never achieved it, it does not communicate in the mode of a primordial 
appropriation of this being, but communicates by gossiping and passing the 
word along” (Heidegger 1949: 168). Gerede now takes on a determinate, 
terminological valence in the argument, one that slips in, as it were, from a 
distinction that was never clearly argued, that between das Beredete (in the 
sense of the referent) and das Geredete (“what has been said or spoken” 
in idiomatic usage, with no sense of devaluation or flaw).
I have spent some time on this discussion of Gerede, but let me put 
it into the context of the larger argument at this point in Sein und Zeit. All 
three forms of the disclosedness of Dasein in its everydayness—idle talk, 
curiosity, ambiguity—are shown to be tributary to the disclosedness of the 
they, and the covering concept for this condition is das Verfallen, entangle-
ment or falling prey. How is this locution to be understood?
“Dasein [is] initially and for the most part immersed in the they and 
mastered by it” (167). The implication here of a yielding, a ceding, supports 
Stambaugh’s translation of “falling- prey” and “entanglement.” One might 
be inclined to interpret the term in a moral or theological sense, but Hei-
degger is at pains to avoid such a connotation. Verfallen, he writes, “does 
not express any negative value judgment” (164). Eugen Fink, closely asso-
ciated to Husserl but also a student of Heidegger, defined Verfallenheit as 
“an omission, a suspension of the ‘transcendence’ of human Dasein” (Fink 
1976: 123). But such a suspension, Françoise Dastur argues, is not to be 
understood as a cancellation. “Dasein,” she writes, “even in its ‘inauthen-
ticity’ (its Uneigentlichkeit), its blindness with respect to the transcendence 
which it has, or rather, which it properly (eigentlich) ‘is,’ since it does not 
expressly bring it about, cannot cease to transcend without denying itself 
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as Dasein” (Dastur 1988: 138; my translation). The idea that Dasein “can-
not cease to transcend” points to an ongoing labor of negativity. Dasein’s 
entanglement in the they (das Man), far from being an irreversible subjec-
tion, an exclusion from a sphere of truth or from an access to being, is the 
very condition of the possibility of disclosure, of Erschlossenheit.
Insofar as the everydayness, the quotidian existence, Dasein, is 
manifest as language, it is as Gerede and not as Logos, for Gerede par-
takes of the condition of lapse or “falling” (Verfall ) that inheres in Dasein.7 
If Dasein is to be taken as the condition of human existence in its everyday-
ness, in the quotidian, and is constitutively in a state of Verfall, isn’t every 
form of Dasein’s expressive capacity, that is, everything that falls under 
Rede, or discourse, and not Gerede alone, necessarily also in that state? 
Or inversely, what justifies qualifying a register of language—precisely lan-
guage as discourse in its everydayness, its typical attachment to Dasein—
as somehow deficient, not directly in touch with being? And yet, insofar as 
Gerede is subject to understanding and interpretation, is it not also sus-
ceptible to that opening up, that moment of disclosure, that leads to a more 
direct manifestation of Logos, to the un- hiddenness of a- leitheia?
If we go back to the lecture course on Aristotle that Heidegger gave 
in 1924, just prior to the appearance of Sein und Zeit, we find a treatment 
of Rede, in conjunction with Logos, Sprache, and Gerede, that aligns it 
clearly with the Greek sense of human existence (Dasein des Menschen) in 
the sense of zoon logon echon. Heidegger then continues, referring to his 
own time, “We do not have a corresponding definition. A more or less cor-
responding one would perhaps be, ‘Man is a living creature who reads the 
newspaper’” (Heidegger 2002: 108; my translation). Here and in the follow-
ing pages, Heidegger is intent on defining a level of ordinary human exis-
tence that would link the Greek experience with the contemporary. Rede, 
he writes, is not to be taken merely in a physiological sense but as an 
ontological component of human existence: “Man is a living being, whose 
true existence [Dasein] is manifest in speech and discourse [im Gespräch 
und in der Rede].” He then claims that “the Greeks were entangled by 
language. . . . The Greeks were altogether absorbed by the external. At 
the time of Plato and Aristotle Dasein was so wholly saturated with idle 
talk [Geschwätz] that it took the combined efforts of both to even attain a 
possibility to take scientific pursuits [Wissenschaft ] seriously” (109). These 
7. “Fallen” language as chatter, Geschwätz, has been treated by Fenves 1993 and 
Fenves 2001. See also Gelley 2015 (81–82, 142–44).
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remarks are, admittedly, in notes taken from lectures, and I do not suggest 
that they take precedence over the text of Sein und Zeit. But they may serve 
to confirm the discussion of Gerede in §35 of Sein und Zeit. Here the nega-
tive valorization of the Greeks’ experience of language of the Aristotle lec-
tures is applied to communication altogether, whether as speech or writing 
(Gerede, Geschreibe [1949: 168]), as the typical way of being interpreted 
(duschschnittlichen Ausgelegtheit [170]) or as the quotidian way of being 
interpreted (alltägliche Ausgelegtheit [169]) of the part of Dasein. It is com-
munication wholly oriented to its articulation at the expense of the referent: 
“What is important to it is that one speaks. The being- said, the saying, the 
pronouncement provide a guarantee for the genuineness and appropriate-
ness of the discourse and the understanding belonging to it” (168).
It is significant, too, that Gerede is “uprooted” (entwurzelt), “and this 
uprooting is constant. Ontologically, this means that when Dasein maintains 
itself in idle talk, it is, as being- in the- world, cut off from the primary and pri-
mordially genuine relations of being towards the world, toward Dasein- with, 
toward being- in itself. It keeps itself in suspension” (170). Now this “sus-
pension,” this “groundless floating” (177), is in no sense a vague or indeter-
minate condition above existence or the world. Rather, it is, as Jean- Luc 
Nancy argues, “the originary undecideability of being- thrown- in- the- world 
(to the ‘they’ )” (Nancy 1993: 96). Nancy here alludes to the end of §34, 
where Heidegger returns to “the existential structures of the disclosed-
ness of being- in- the- world,” and specifically of “Dasein, as thrown being- in- 
the- world, initially thrown into the publicness of the they” (Heidegger 1949: 
167). Here Nancy sees a possible discrepancy: the phrase “publicness of 
the they” indicates that “Dasein is opened to the ‘they,’ to which it is thrown 
as to its everyday world; this means . . . to a world of mediocre and ‘inau-
thentic’ banality from which Dasein should decide to extract itself. But the 
expression can also signify—and must signify, according to the deepest 
logic of analysis—that the ‘they’ carries disclosedness along with it, gives 
disclosedness, and even that it is, before everything else, the site of dis-
closedness” (Nancy 1993: 89). This double orientation of Dasein—at once 
trapped in the mediocrity of the they and open to its always available dis-
closedness—is the basis for the significance that Nancy attaches to “deci-
sion” (Entschlossenheit) in Sein und Zeit. Not a resolute act of assump-
tion but something like “the activity of its passivity” (105) or of existence as 
“being determined according to indetermination, in such a way that, to be 
what it is, it must decide/reach its decision” (105).
One may wonder whether, in light of the covering/disclosing dynamic 
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of Heideggerian phenomenology, the argument of §§34–35 of Sein und 
Zeit puts forward an essentially negative valorization of Gerede. Admittedly, 
Heidegger sought to avoid such a valorization when he wrote, “The expres-
sion ‘idle talk’ [Gerede] is not to be used here in a ‘disparaging’ sense. Ter-
minologically, it means a positive phenomenon which constitutes the mode 
of being of the understanding and interpretation of everyday Dasein’s” 
(167). But this did not prevent comments like that of Michael E. Zimmer-
man: “In reading Section B [of chap. 5], I find that Heidegger is speaking 
not about average disclosedness but about inauthentic disclosedness. . . . 
Idle talk is the ideology of everydayness and inauthenticity” (1986: 53, 57). 
While such a statement could be supported by certain passages in Hei-
degger’s text, an approach like Zimmerman’s stresses the opposition of 
inauthentic/authentic and gives Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein in its every-
dayness an ethical and existential slant that does not give due weight to the 
rhetorical issues at play. What I have tried to show is that the valorization of 
Gerede (and of Neugier and Zweideutigkeit) does not consist in anything 
like an explicit judgment but emerges from the complex, circuitous forma-
tion of concepts relating to speech and language in Sein und Zeit.
It may help to view the issue that Heidegger raises with respect to 
the coordinate manifestations of Dasein’s being- in- the- world in the context 
of language as “a form of life” in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s sense: “‘So you are 
saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?’—It 
is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the lan-
guage they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in the form of life” 
(1958: §241). Admittedly, this introduces a dimension quite foreign to what 
is generally understood as Heidegger’s thought, but it seems to me that 
the claims of Sein und Zeit, and notably, in its treatment of speech and 
language, should be open to this. The kind of agreement that Wittgenstein 
refers to has been glossed by Stanley Cavell: “The idea of agreement here 
is not that of coming to or arriving at an agreement on a given occasion, 
but of being in agreement throughout, being in harmony. . . . That a group 
of human beings stimmen in their language überein says, so to speak, that 
they are mutually voiced with respect to it, mutually attuned top to bottom” 
(Cavell 1979: 32). This seems quite consistent with Heidegger’s analysis in 
§29 of the way that Dasein’s being- in- the- world is grounded in attunement 
and mood (Befindlichkeit, Stimmung).
What I have attempted is, in a sense, a heuristic reading of the 
“lapse” or entanglement of Dasein, one that seeks to situate the place of 
Gerede in Dasein’s sense- making capacity. In foregrounding this potential 
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of Gerede—one that is based on the covering/uncovering mode of Ersch-
lossenheit and of truth as a- leitheia—I realize that I am drawing out an 
implication of Sein und Zeit that in part runs counter to its explicit argument 
and, even more, to Heidegger’s later work on language, where he will look 
to art to provide a means for the disclosure of truth by way, for example, of 
an opening (in a forest), a “lighting” (Lichtung).
Maurice Blanchot, in an essay on Louis- René des Forêts’s Le 
Bavard, a novel that seeks to systematically dramatize the practice of idle 
talk (bavardage), provides this revealing commentary:
In truth, everyone indulges in idle talk [bavarde] but everyone con-
demns idle talk [bavardage]. Adults say it to children: you’re just 
prattling; just as the male says it to the female, the philosopher to 
the ordinary man, the politician to the philosopher: bavardage. This 
reproach stops everyone in their tracks. I have always been struck 
by the intense and admiring approbation that has been universally 
accorded to Heidegger when, under the pretext of conducting an 
analysis and in his characteristic sober and forceful manner, he con-
demns inauthentic speech—despicable speech that is never that of 
the resolute, laconic, and heroic “I” but the non- speech of the irre-
sponsible “they.” They speak, which is to say, no one speaks. Which 
is to say, we live in a world where there is speech without a speaking 
subject, a civilization of speakers without speech, aphasic prattlers, 
reporters who report without declaring themselves, technicians with-
out name or the power of decision. This discredited speech encloses 
within the discredit which is directed at it the judgment which one 
makes of it. He who considers another a bavard renders himself 
suspect of a worse bavardage, pretentious and authoritarian. The 
appeal to seriousness, which requires that one speak only with due 
deliberation and gravity, or else that one not speak at all or only 
begin to speak, soon reveals itself as an attempt to close off lan-
guage. It’s a matter of arresting words under the pretext of giving 
them back their dignity. One imposes silence by, oneself, denying 
the right to speak. One denounces empty talk and substitutes for it 
the cutting word which does not talk but commands. (Blanchot 1971: 
145–46; my translation)
Blanchot does not enter in detail into Heidegger’s position, though he is 
alert to its equivocal stance. He goes on, in a vein quite independent of Hei-
degger, to examine the insidious power of idle talk—its power to “close off 
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language,” to deny “the right to speak,” and, for all its hollowness, to impose 
and command.
It’s true that, in terms of the architectonic plan of Sein und Zeit, the 
interpretation of Dasein in its everydayness in Division 1 is provisional and 
leads to the analysis that comes in Division 2. In this later part, the distor-
tion, the constitutive self- misinterpreting of Dasein that was presented in a 
“preparatory” manner in Division 1 is subjected to a more rigorous analysis 
guided by the category of temporality. Nonetheless, Heidegger in no sense 
claims that Sein und Zeit will provide a means of redeeming Dasein from 
its state of worldly entanglement. Thus he writes, “Dasein can never escape 
the everyday way of being interpreted into which Dasein has grown initially. 
All genuine understanding, interpreting and communication, rediscovery 
and new appropriation come about in it and out of it and against it” (Hei-
degger 1949: 169). In this sense, I argue that Gerede, in its very negativity, 
is not to be understood as an aberration, a lapse from some supposed 
positivity, but as a component of the systematic entanglement of Dasein’s 
being- in- the- world.
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